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This article examines choice of health care in Japan when patients suﬀer from relatively
minor illnesses. Data was obtained from Basic Survey on People’s Life for 1986, 1989,
1992 and 1995. Patients’ heath information enable authors to make a distinction between
acute and chronic illnesses, and mild and serious illnesses. Authors exclude acute and
serious illnesses from the analysis and deﬁne minor illnesses if illness is not chronic or not
serious. Empirical results show that in the case of these minor illnesses, price sensitivities
(changes in the probability due to price change) for the medical service are between 0.144
∼ 0.149. Authors also estimate price sensitivities for medical service demand separately for
43 symptoms. Among these symptoms, for almost half of the symptoms, estimated price
sensitivities are below 1.
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Japan’s health care system has been relatively successful. Gross health indicators are the
best in the world: the infant mortality rate is 0. 46 per cent of live births and the life
expectancy is 75.9 years for males and 81.8 years for females (World Bank, 1998).
There is universal coverage with virtually unlimited access to all health care facilities.
As a ratio of national income in Japan, national medical costs were 7.28 per cent in 1993.
This ﬁgure is a little more than half of the same ratio in the United States. However, in
1997, national medical costs exceeded 28 trillion yen (about 230 billion US dollars) and
continue to rise by at least one trillion yen every year.
There are at least three factors in this expenditure growth. The ﬁrst factor is the ageing
population. The rate at which the Japanese population is ageing is much faster than in
other industrial nations. This is expected to contribute to a continued rise in medical care
costs.
The second factor is the high utilization of hopitals. In Japan there is little functional
diﬀerentiation between clinics and hospitals, and their boundary is further blurred because
a third of the clinics have a small number of beds (the distinction is primarily legal in
that facilities with more than 20 beds are designated as hospitals, whereas those having
fewer than 20 are called clinics). Neither is there much diﬀerentiation between acute and
long-term care (Ikegami,1992). The price of all providers (hospitals and clinics) is uniform,
assuming that their quality is the same. However, patients are increasingly turning away
from clinics in favour of hospitals because of their perceived higher quality. As a result,
there are long queues for outpatients’ visits and waiting lists for admissions to hospital.
This situation is diﬃcult to reverse because ”freedom of choice” is regarded as the cardinal
principle in the delivery of health care in Japan.
The third factor is the high per capita costs for medications. Most physicians in clinics do
their own dispensing and hospital-based doctors dispense from the institution’s pharmacy.
1The government sets no limits on the quantity of medications dispensed. Market prices
are surveyed periodically by the government and reimbursement prices are accordingly
adjusted. However, providers continue to make proﬁts because competition leads to a new
round of price-cutting. They maintain that they need this margin to oﬀset the relatively
low reimbursement rates for the medical procedures they provide. Therefore, doctors have
an incentive to over-prescribe. Patients’ medical insurance covers medication costs, giving
them a price incentive to favour prescribed products.
The health care reform plan proposes to increase the coinsurance rate for relatively minor
illnesses as well as for prescribed medications for these minor illnesses. Minor illnesses are
illnesses such as common cold and diarrhea, which are curable by standard treatment with
reasonable cost. Their treatment has several options including medical services provided
by hospital or clinic. Therefore, the eﬀect anticipated of an increase in the coinsurance rate
on national medical costs is not clear. If patients are not sensitive to a price change, an
increase in the coinsurance rate may not have an appreciable eﬀect on national costs. On
the other hand, if patients are sensitive to a price increase, they may choose other options
and decide to seek medical services less frequently. An increase in the coinsurance rate will
then decrease the national medical costs.
When patients suﬀer from minor illnesses they face three options in this research: they
can consult a doctor, purchase over-the-counter (OTC) medications or do nothing. The
price sensitivity, therefore, may be relatively high, but this has to be tested empirically1).
In the United States, where extensive research on health economics is undertaken, only
a few studies focus on demand for medical services related to minor illnesses or on the sub-
stitution between prescribed and OTC medications (Stuart and James, 1995; Fillenbaum,
et al., 1995). Of these few studies, particular attention is paid to the research of Leibowitz
(1989) because of its originality and, most of all, its research design. The research was part
of the study referred to as the Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) that Newhouse (1993)
and others at the RAND institute initiated in 1971, and that lasted for about 10 years. HIE
2is a longitudinal study that experimentally altered the medical care cost-sharing faced by
families. Between November 1974 and February 1977, HIE assigned families to insurance
plans that diﬀered in the amount of cost-sharing. According to this study, under a free
plan (deﬁned as no out-of-pocket cost to the family), compared to a 95 per cent coinsur-
ance plan (families paid 95 per cent of their medical expenses), the demand for medical
services increased by about 20 per cent. The spending on medical services under the free
plan was 50 per cent more than that of the 95 per cent coinsurance plan. This means the
price sensitivity (change in the probability due to price change) of medical service was , on
average, 0.21.
Using the HIE, Leibowitz (1989) focused on minor illnesses and analysed the substitu-
tion between prescribed and OTC medications. Her empirical results did not support the
expectation that people assigned less generous insurance for prescription drugs substitute
OTC for prescriptions. Although the price sensitivity/price elasticity was not accounted for
in either study, Newhouse (1993) indicated that, in the case of inﬂuenza, price sensitivity
was around unity. This suggests that for minor illnesses, the demand for medical services
is relatively sensitive to price.
In Japan, there are only a few studies that estimate the demand for medical services.
Among these studies, Yamada (1997) used hospital-based data to estimate the demand for
medical services. Without the use of a household-based survey, he was not able to analyse
patients’ preferences, decisions and behaviour regarding medical services.
Ii and Ohkusa (1998a) were the ﬁrst to attempt an estimation of the demand for medical
services related to minor illnesses. They modelled explicitly the incidence of minor illnesses
and, using micro household data, measured the price sensitivity of the demand for medical
care for minor illnesses in Japan. Their data, from the Basic Survey on People’s Life
(BSPL), were not experimentally or extensively collected like the data in the HIE. However,
the sample size in the BSPL - about 600,000 - is much larger compared to that of the HIE,
which is about 2,000. BSPL includes household and individual characteristics such as
3gender, age, income and assets, and detailed health information. Their results show that
the price sensitivity for medical services was 0.208, which is comparable to that for the
United States, and that medical services and OTC medications are substitutes.
This paper, using patients’ heath information, deﬁnes minor illnesses and estimates price
sensitivity for these minor illnesses. The data set also includes detailed information on
subjective symptoms. Authors also estimate price sensitivty for medical service demand
separately for 43 symptoms. Empirical results show that in the case of these minor illnesses,
the price sensitivity for the medical service are between 0.144 ∼ 0.149.
Section 2 presents this study’s major hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. The
empirical model is explained in Section 4. Empirical results are given in Section 5. A
summary and conclusion are given at the end.
2 Hypotheses
Risk aversion and uncertainty about future health events create a demand for medical
insurance. However, once insurance is in place, moral hazard leads to over-utilization
of medical care. This phenomenon may be more serious in the case of relatively minor
illnesses. There is no reason for rates of insurance to be the same for diﬀerent types of
health care. In this section, the eﬀects on national medical costs and patients’ consumer
surplus are analysed under an assumed scenario where the new medical insurance reforms
exclude minor illnesses from insurance coverage.
Under the universal medical insurance plan, there is a gap between the price a patient
faces and the price a society faces. Figure 1 shows the market for medical services. The
vertical axis shows social costs of medical services and the horizontal axis shows quantities
of medical services. In our model, quantity is measured by the proportion of patients who
visited doctors out of the total number of patients. The supply curve (SS) is horizontal in
the short run. This reﬂects the fact that, in Japan doctors cannot refuse patients’ treatment
4and cannot increase prices in times of high demand. Queuing is the rationing device used
to limit demand. The value of waiting time is part of the implicit price.
Suppose DD refers to the demand for patients without medical insurance and D D  for
patients with medical insurance. Suppose further that the current price level is given by
AO so that the current quantity consumed in the market by patients without medical
insurance is given by QO. Hence, total expenditure on the commodity is given by the area
of the rectangle AOQH. However, if the market demand curve is actually equal to DD,
then some consumers would be willing to pay more for some units of the commodity than
the market price AO. The total amount that consumers would be willing to pay is equal
to the rectangle AOQH plus the triangle GHA, that is, the consumer surplus.
Under a medical insurance plan, the patient is on the demand curve D D  and increases
his demand from QO to Q O. Since a coinsurance is BO,h epa y s BOQ F and the govern-
ment pays ABFE. The consumer surplus increases by ABFH and the national medical
costs increase by HQQ E. If an increase in consumer surplus (ABFH) is greater than
the increase in national medical costs (HQQ E), then medical insurance is beneﬁcial to
consumers. In order to measure the eﬀect of a rise in the coinsurance rate on national
medical costs, a demand function for medical services needs to be estimated.
The demand for medical services by a patient i suﬀering from a minor illness at period t
depends on the price of the medical service or coinsurance, pM
i,t, the price of a close substitute
such as OTC medications pO
t , income Ii,t, the opportunity cost to visit a doctor Ci,t, and
other variables that aﬀect the demand for medical services Zi,t. Therefore, the demand for
medical services is expressed as d(pM
i,t,p O
t ,I i,t,C i,t,Z i,t). The variable Zi,t includes health
capital, employment status, and attitudes toward medical services.
In this paper, the hypotheses to be tested are that: 1) medical services are normal goods
in an economic sense and 2) medical services are substitutes for OTC medication. Using the





t > 0, ∂d
∂Ii,t > 0, ∂d
∂Ci,t <
50,and ∂d
∂Zi,t < 0, that is, an increase in coinsurance decreases the demand for medical care,
an increase in the price of OTC medications increases the demand for medical care, an
increase in income level increases the demand for medical care, an increase in the time cost
decreases the demand for medical care, and, ﬁnally, an increase in health capital decreases
the demand for medical care. When relatively healthy persons suﬀer from an illness they
are more likely to recover sooner. Therefore, the marginal cost in receiving medical services
is considered to be low.
3 Data
The data for this research were obtained from Basic Survey on People’s Life for 1986,
1989, 1992, and 1995 by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, Japan. The questionnaire for
this survey consists of three sections: household, health, and income and saving. All the
households answered the household and health sections while only a sixth of the households
answered the income and saving section. The survey covered all the 47 prefectures in Japan.
Among these prefectures, 2,000 areas were randomly chosen, and within the chosen areas,
all the households were surveyed.
Although the data are not panel since areas were randomly chosen each time, this data
set provides rich information especially on income and consumption, job status, the type of
medical insurance, and health condition. The analysis focuses on those between 22 and 59
years old, neither hospitalized nor permanently bed-ridden2), and who suﬀer from a minor
illness.
The variables used in this analysis are age, gender, symptoms (period, seriousness),
type of occupation (managerial position, government employee, employee at the large, or
medium-sized enterprise, non-regular worker), labor income, per capita household income
minus own labor income, net ﬁnancial asset, real asset (tax payment on tangible asset),
and medical insurance enrollment (type, insured or dependent).
6Testing the hypothesis stated in the previous section requires information on the prices
of medical services, pM
i,t. These price data are not available from the survey. However,
everyone answers the type of medical insurance (National Health Insurance or Employees’
Insurance) and their insurance status (insurer or dependent) in the questionnaire. Under
the Japanese health insurance system for self-employed persons, pensioners and their de-
pendents (National Health Insurance), coinsurance rate is 30 percent for both in-patient
and out-patient care. Under the insurance system for employees (Employees’ Insurance),
coinsurance rate is 10 percent of the medical costs. For their dependents, coinsurance rate
is 20 percent for inpatient care and 30 percent for outpatient care.
Moreover, prices of OTC medications, pO
t , are not available. Year dummy is used since
everyone faces the same price within the same year. Also, prefecture dummy represents
the regional variations such as competition among pharmacies or attitude toward OTC
medications.
Income variables Ii,t include own labor income, total household income net of own labor
income, net ﬁnancial asset, and real asset. For time cost, the employment status is used.
For example, when a patient holds managerial position, he or she has a higher time cost
compared to those who do not hold such a position. When a patient holds only a short
time contract, he or she might have a lower time cost.
Except for the 0.6 percent of the population receiving public health care assistance, all
Japanese are mandatorily covered by National Health Insurance or Employees’ Insurance
plans. Therefore, in either plan, patients without jobs face a coinsurance rate of 30 percent.
Patients who are not employed face higher coinsurance rate but lower time costs of
demand for medical services than patients with jobs. Therefore, in the following analysis,
there is a need to distinguish whether the change in demand comes from diﬀerent level of
time costs or diﬀerent level of coinsurance rates. In the next section, the authors separately
estimate the demand for the whole sample - both workers and non-workers - and the demand
only for those who have jobs - workers.
7Sample size for the workers is 60,487. Sample size for both employed and not-employed
is 86,065. The ﬁrst half of table 1 shows the sample statistics for workers. It reveals the
following characteristics: 33 percent sought medical service, 30 percent purchased OTC,
and 37 percent did nothing. The average age is 43.4 years, and 43 percent of the patients
are female. On average, the patients stay in bed for 0.45 days. Less than four percent of
the workers hold managerial positions. Among patients, 6.4 percent work as government
employees, 12.7 percent work for the large enterprises those which have 1,000 or more
employees, and 16.3 percent work for the medium-sized enterprises those which have 100 to
999 employees. About seven percent are non-regular employees whose employment period
is from one to 12 months. The average annual labor income is 1.31 million yen, other
income is 0.32 million yen, and net ﬁnancial asset is 1.84 million yen. For 59 percent of the
patients, coinsurance rate is 10 percent. Of the total sample, 70.3 percent have jobs. The
second half of table 1 shows the sample statistics for the total population, both workers and
non-workers. In this sample, a proportion of the female is higher at 57 percent compared
to that in the workers only sample. For the 42 percent of the patients, coinsurance rate is
10 percent, and only 70 percent are workers. Therefore, it is not surprising that average
annual labor income is only 0.31 million yen while other income is 0.48 million yen, higher
than that for workers.
4 Estimation Model
The dependent variable takes three values: Ti,t = 1 if a patient demands medical services3),
Ti,t = 2 if a patient demands OTC, and Ti,t = 0 in other cases. Independent variables are
age Ai,t, gender (Gi,t = 1 if female, Gi,t = 0 if male) his or her own labor income Ii,t,pe r
capita household income net of own labor income, ˇ Ii,t net ﬁnancial asset Fi,t, real asset
(ﬁxed property tax payment) Ri,t, Employment status dummy (Wi,t = 1 1 if a patient
is employed and Wi,t = 0 if otherwise), type of occupation (JM
i,t = 1 if holds managerial
8position, JM
i,t = 0 otherwise, JG
i,t = 1 if works as a government employee, JG
i,t = 0 otherwise,
JL
i,t = 1 if works for a large enterprise, JL
i,t = 0 otherwise, and JM
i,t = 1 if employed by a
medium-sized enterprise, JM
i,t = 0 otherwise) , length of employment (JP
i,t = 1 if employment
period is from one to 12 months, JP
i,t = 0 otherwise), coinsurance rate Pi,t, and prefecture
and year dummy variables. Since there is no information on OTC prices, prefecture dummy
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by using multinomial probit estimation method is used (Daganzo, 1979) 4). Because the
probability of choosing j adds upto 1, we can estimate the diﬀerences in p robability.
Here, we set j = 0, the choice of ”do nothing”, as the basis for comparison. The error
term, ε
j
i,t(j =0 ,1,2), is a random variable and Ω follows a three-dimensional normal





















The estinmation procedure is BHHH method with grid research over ρ and σ. This proce-
dure is as accurate as Keane(1992) has shown.
5 Estimation Results
The data set includes detailed information on the type of illness, therefore it allows the
authors to distinguish whether an illness is acute or chronic, and mild or serious. Authors
9exclude acute and serious illnesses from the analysis and deﬁne that a patient suﬀers from a
minor illness if he reports at least one of the following illnesses: hypertension, hypotension,
common cold, gastritis, decayed tooth, gingivitis, autonomic nerve, troubles with eyes or
ears, nasal catarrh, skin trouble, neurosis, osteoporosis, or women’s diseases. If a patient
does not see a doctor and does not know a type of illness he suﬀers from, it is also deﬁned
as a minor illness.
Tables 2 and 3 show the determinants of the workers’ demand for medical services and
OTC when they suﬀer from minor illnesses as deﬁned above. Sample size is 40,895. The ﬁrst
columns show marginal eﬀects. These eﬀects tell how a unit change in explanatory variable
changes probabilities of choosing medical services or OTC. For example, a probability of
choosing medical service is 4.7 percent higher, and of choosing OTC 3.1 percent lower for
government employees than for others.
Other studies have found that females demand medical care more than males do (Lei-
bowitz, 1989; Ii and Ohkusa, 1998). However, when analyses are focused on the case of
minor illnesses, not on illnesses in general, there seems to be no clear gender diﬀerences in
the demand behavior.
Coinsurance rate is signiﬁcantly positive. This implies that a demand curve is downward
sloping, and increasing coinsurance rate from 10 to 30 percent, medical demand decreases
by 2.98 percent. This means, on average, price sensitivity is 0.149 for workers. US data
show that the lowest estimate of the price sensitivity of medical service in general is 0.21,
which is equivalent to our estimate5). However, in the US, a price sensitivity of medical
service for minor illnesses (inﬂuenza) is around 1 and much larger than ours 6).
Tables 4 and 5 show estimation results for the total sample. All of them in the sample
suﬀer from the minor illnesses as deﬁned above. The sample size is 57,521. Increasing coin-
surance rate from 10 to 30 percent, medical demand decreases by 2.88 percent, therefore,
on average, price sensitivity is 0.144.
The data set also includes detailed information on subjective symptoms. Authors esti-
10mate price sensitivities for medical service demand separately for the following 43 symp-
toms: fever, languidness, insomnia, headache, dizziness, sluggishness, numbness, mucus,
dimness of sight, pain in ear, ringing in ear, toothache, bleeding gums, nasal congestion,
running nose, soar throat, cough, phlegm, wheezing, palpitation, short of breath, pain in
chest, nausea, diarrhea, constipation, heartburn, indigestion, diminished appetite, stom-
achache, hemorrhoid, eruption, pruritus, pain in urination, frequent urination, incontinence
of urine, morning sickness, menstrual irregularity, vaginal discharge, incised wound, sprain,
stiﬀ shoulders, backache, and arthralgia 7). Among these symptoms, for almost half of the
symptoms, estimated price sensitivities are below 1. For example, a price sensitivity for
workers is 0.55 for fever, 0.27 for sore throat, and 0.25 for stomachache. These results are
almost the same as the total sample.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, using data from Basic Survey on People’s Life, the price elasticity of demand
for medical services in case of relatively minor illnesses is estimated. The data set includes
detailed information on the type of illness, therefore it allows the authors to deﬁne minor
illnesses in more accurate manner. With this deﬁnition, authors obtain the price sensitivity
around 0.144-0.149.
In the sample, 32 percent sought medical services, therefore, the estimated price sensi-
tivity suggests that if the new medical insurance reform plan should exclude minor illnesses
from the insurance coverage, almost half of the patients - 13.5 percent point - may stop
seeking medical services. The data set also includes detailed information on subjective
symptoms. Authors are able to estimate price sensitivity for medical service demand sep-
arately for 43 symptoms. Estimation results show that among these symptoms, for almost
half of the symptoms, estimated price sensitivities are below one.
These results are, however, obtained from a household survey, including medical infor-
11mation, which was conducted on a given day. Therefore, extreme care must be exercised
in interpreting the results. Ideally, longitudinal survey will improve the results. This is the
subject matter of further investigation.
12Footnote
*) This research has beneﬁted from a research meeting called ”Social Welfare and Eco-
nomics”. We would like to acknowledge the comments of the participants at the
meeting, particularly Masahiro Toriyama and Maki Yoshida of the Nomura Research
Institute and Makoto Satito, Yasushi Iwamoto, and Kotaro Hitomi from Kyoto Uni-
versity and other seminar participants at Miyatsu conference. The views expressed
herein are the authors’ own and do not reﬂect that of their institutional aﬃliations.
We would also like to acknowledge the assistance provided by Kazuko Matsumoto.
1) Surprisingly, there is no documentation which explains the amount of national medi-
cal costs spent on relatively minor illnesses because nationwide surveys are done only
on particular days. For example, the Ministry of Health and Welfare conducts a
patient survey on June 1 of every year, and a hospital and clinic survey on October
1 of every year. These surveys, conducted in summer or fall, will not give us a re-
liable estimate on medical cost used, for example, for cold or ﬂu. A rough estimate
shows that about half of the total medical cost is for the outpatients. Out of these
costs however, no information is given on the shares of the cost for minor illnesses
or for chronic diseases including geriatric diseases. Therefore, in this paper, using an
estimate of the price sensitivity of medical demand for minor illnesses, we can only
measure a reduction in medical cost by proportion, not by value. Medical cost used
for minor illnesses should be also estimated by research.
2) If a patient is bed-ridden for more than a month, then we deﬁne the patient as
permanently bed-ridden.
3) Note that the data are not panel.
134) Multinomial logit is easier to estimate than multinomial probit. But in multino-
mial logit, odds ratio have to be independent of the other alternatives. Hausman-
McFadden (1984) test suggests that if a subset of the choice set is truly irrelevant,
omitting the choice set in our model Ti,t = 0, from the model will not change pa-
rameter estimates systematically. Hausman-Mcfadden test statistics for workers are
124.12 and for the whole sample 156.84. With the degree of freedom, 64 and 63,
respectively, chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis of independence with 99
percent probability. Therefore, we are not able to use multinomial logit model.
5) Our estimate is obtained from a one-day survey for the patients who reported illness
on the particular day, while in the US, the estimate is from a longitudinal, one-year
survey.
6) There is no account on the price sensitivity or price elasticity of medical service for
minor illnesses in either Newhouse (1993) or Leibowits (1989). This price sensitivity
is inferred from their tables.
7) Estimation results can be obtained from authors upon request.
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Medical service .3285445 .469689 0 1
Over-the-Counter medication .2999614 .4582456 0 1
Do nothing ɹ .3714941 .4832093 0 1
Age ɹ 43.38016 10.48763 22 60
Length of stay-in-bed .4517851 1.408925 0 10
Female .4339566 .4956244 0 1
Managerial position .0389613 .1935049 0 1
Government employee .0640921 .2449196 0 1
Medium-sized enterprise .1273265 .333342 0 1
Large enterprise .1626855 .3690824 0 1
Non-regular employee .0696458 .2545518 0 1
Labor income (in logʣ 4.875487 2.053332 0 9.30556
Other income (in log) 3.478245 2.011145 0 8.729397
Net ﬁnancial asset 183.8823 973.8945 -2250 3250
Real asset (in log) 2.393375 2.571293 0 11.51293
Coinsurance rate (dummy) .5877219 .49225 0 1
(continued(
17(contiuned)
Both Workers and Non-Workers (N=86,065)
Medical service .3430768 .4747405 0 1
Over-the-Counter Medication .297897 .4573375 0 1
Do nothing .3590262 .4797185 0 1
Age ɹ 43.68973 10.74956 22 60
Length of stay-in-bed .5215702 1.558349 0 10
Female ɹ .5737092 .4945408 0 1
Managerial position .0273913 .1632219 0 1
Government employee .0450592 .2074355 0 1
Medium-sized enterprise .0895153 .2854883 0 1
Large enterprise .114374 .3182674 0 1
Non-regular employee .0489636 .2157936 0 1
Labor income (in log) 3.427651 2.815468 0 9.30556
Other income (in log) 3.873235 1.864505 0 8.729397
Net ﬁnancial asset 201.6496 978.447 -2250 3250
Real asset (in log) 2.319853 2.565762 0 11.51293
Employment status (dummy) .7030376 .4569233 0 1
Coinsurance rate (dummy) .4158438 .4928706 0 1
Note: (1) ”Medical service”, ”Over-the-Counter Medication”, and ”Do nothing” are dummy
variables which take the value of one if a patient chooses the choice, and 0 if otherwise.
(2) ”Female” is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a patient is female and
0 if male.
(3) ”Managerial position”, ”Government”, ”Large enterprise”, and ”Medium-size enter-
prise” are dummy variables which take the value of one if a patient holds a managerial
position, works at government, works at large enterprise with 1,000 or more employees,
and works at medium-size enterprise with 100 to 999 employees, respectively.
(4) ”Non-regular employee” is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if employ-
ment period is between one to 12 months.
(5) ”Labor income”, ”Other income”, ”Net ﬁnancial asset” and ”Real asset (Tax payment
on tangible asset)” are in 10,000 yen, in 1995 real term.
(6) ”Coinsurance rate” is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if coinsurance
rate is 10 percent (employees), and 0 if it is 30 percent.
18(7) ”Employment status” is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a patient
is employed and 0 if otherwise.
19Table 2 :Marginal Eﬀect for Medical Services (Workers Only)
Explanatory variables marginal eﬀect t-value Prob Value
Age ɹ .0001615 0.331 0.741
Length of stay-in-bed .0049182 1.994 0.046
Female ɹɹ -.0030734 -0.333 0.739
Managerial position .0070886 0.359 0.720
Government employee .0461069 2.472 0.013
Medium-sized enterprise .0109177 0.819 0.413
Large enterprise .0210605 1.589 0.112
Non-regular employee -.0104414 -0.654 0.513
Labor income (in log) -.0034317 -1.440 0.150
Other income (in log) .0014803 0.661 0.509
Net ﬁnancial asset 5.75e-06 1.458 0.145
Real asset (in log) -.0022794 -1.026 0.305
Coinsurance rate .0298321 2.768 0.006
Note:
Number of observation is 40,895.
Marginal eﬀects indicate discrete changes from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.
Pseudo R2 is 0.2141. An estimated coeﬃcient and t-value (in parenthesis) of ρ are
0.3343(2.7697) and of σ are 0.7384(4.3744).
An estimation equation includes a constant term, but in this table of marginal eﬀect, a
constant term cannot be deﬁned.
20Table 3 :Marginal Eﬀect for Over-the-Counter Medication
(Workers Only)
Explanatory variables marginal eﬀect t-value Prob Value
Age ɹ .0009445 2.152 0.031
Length of stay-in-bed .0023762 1.185 0.236
Female ɹɹ -.0148858 -1.919 0.055
Managerial position -.033997 -2.003 0.045
Government employee -.0294592 -1.905 0.057
Medium-sized enterprise .005575 0.490 0.624
Large enterprise -.017644 -1.581 0.114
Non-regular employee .0190208 1.424 0.154
Labor income (in log) -.0019374 -0.973 0.330
Other income (in log) -.0018038 -0.911 0.362
Net ﬁnancial asset -6.54e-06 -1.880 0.060
Real asset (in log) -.0019862 -0.998 0.318
Coinsurance rate -.0103842 -1.158 0.247
Note:
Number of observation is 40,895.
Marginal eﬀects indicate discrete changes from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.
21Table 4 :Marginal Eﬀect for Medical Services (Both Workers and
Non-Workers)
Explanatory variables marginal eﬀect t-value Prob Value
Age ɹ .0002723 0.706 0.480
Length of stay-in-bed .0038797 1.918 0.055
Female ɹ -.007847 -0.914 0.361
Managerial Position .0082478 0.430 0.667
Government employee .0472706 2.573 0.010
Medium-sized enterprise .0115126 0.873 0.383
Large enterprise .0227414 1.794 0.073
Non-regular employee -.010579 -0.656 0.512
Labor income (in log) -.0041296 -1.806 0.071
Other income (in log) .0013366 0.640 0.522
Net ﬁnancial asset 3.06e-06 0.862 0.389
Real asset (in log) -.0034369 -1.875 0.061
Employment status (dummy) -.0232418 -1.974 0.048
Coinsurance rate .0288198 2.873 0.004
Note:
Number of observation is 57,521.
Marginal eﬀects indicate discrete changes from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.
Pseudo R2 is 0.1669. An estimated coeﬃcient and t-value (in parenthesis) of ρ are
0.3132(3.1765) and of σ are 0.6758(5.8765).
22Table 5 :Marginal Eﬀect for Over-the-Counter Medication
(Workers and Non-Workers)
Explanatory variables marginal eﬀect t-value Prob Value
Age ɹ .0008619 2.512 0.012
Length of stay-in-bed .0023855 1.563 0.118
Female ɹ -.0085012 -1.207 0.227
Managerial position -.0352704 -2.130 0.033
Government employee -.030698 -1.983 0.047
Medium-sized enterprise .0057971 0.508 0.612
Large enterprise ɹ -.0183217 -1.705 0.088
Non-regular employee .0191237 1.431 0.152
Labor income (in log) -.0012599 -0.656 0.512
Other income (in log) -.002835 -1.507 0.132
Net ﬁnancial asset -2.52e-06 -0.814 0.416
Real asset (in log) -.0008394 -0.545 0.586
Employment status .0139663 1.328 0.184
Coinsurance rate -.0097513 -1.182 0.237
Note: Number of observation is 57,521.
Marginal eﬀects indicate discrete changes from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.
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